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INVESTMENT REGULATION AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
EMPLOYER-MANAGED
PENSION PLANS
SETH EARL HERBERT*
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana closed its
doors, terminated its pension plan, and, as a result, unexpectedly af-
fected the retirement security of 10,500 workers. Although the pen-
sion plan had been in operation for only 14 years, the trust had ac-
cumulated $25 million in assets. Nonetheless, the final distribution of
these assets eventually left 4,000 employees between the ages of 40
and 60 with only IS percent of their accrued benefits, and 2,900
workers under the age of 40 with absolutely nothing.'
The Studebaker experience is not unique. In 1972, 1,227 termi-
nated pension plans were reported to the Internal Revenue Service. 2
Nineteen thousand four hundred claimants, covered by 546 of these
*J.D., Harvard University, 1974; Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, New York.
This article is adapted front it paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the Juris Doctor
degree requirements or Harvard University.
' See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS. PRIVATE PENSION TAN REFORM, H.R. REP.
No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974); PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY,
1972, REPORT OE HEARINGS ON PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS, BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR OF 'HIE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR ANT) PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1972). See aim 118 CoNG, REC. 21672 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Wyatt).
2 DEPARTMENT OF 'HIE TREASURY AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. STUDY OF PENSION
PLAN TERMINATIONS, 1972: FINAL REPORT 2 (1973) [hereinafter TERMINATIONS]. This
report, published jointly by the two departments, sets forth the results of a study of all
single-employer pension plan terminations which were reported to the IRS during 1972
and all multi-employer plan terminations reported between January 1965 and De-
cember 1971. Id. al I. The statistics cited refer to single-employer plans. Data available
for multi-employer plans indicates that an overwhelming majority of reported plan
terminations occur on the merger of one plan into another and therefore benefit losses
are negligible. Id. at 76, 80.
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plans, lost a total present value of $48.7 million in accrued retirement
benefits.' While claimants losing benefits in 1972 represented less
than .08 percent of all workers covered by private pension plans, 4 the
spectre of the Studebaker case has nevertheless sensitized the public
to the vast potential for social dislocation inherent in the failure of
any retirement income plan. Although the incidence of benefit loss
has continued to be negligible, the problem of benefit security has be-
come increasingly important as both pension coverage and public re-
liance on privately sponsored retirement income plans expand.
The market value of the total assets of private, non-insured pen-
sion funds was $150 billion at the end of 1972. 5 Dr. Roger Murray of
Columbia University, speaking in the wake of the dramatic
Studebaker termination, noted that "no aggregation of financial assets
[so large had] ever escaped close regulation."° While statutory regula-
tion of private pension plans did exist at that time, the efficacy of this
regulation in protecting employee expectations was questionable. Fed-
eral regulation centered around the indirect control afforded by
awarding tax benefits' to pension funds that complied with conditions
specified in the Internal Revenue Code (the Code).° Under the Code,
however, the only sanction that existed for failure to comply with the
specified conditions was withdrawal of the plan's tax-exempt status.°
Because this sanction was so drastic it was rarely invoked. Conse-
quently, the effectiveness of the Code's regulation was seriously
undermined.'"
An attempt was also made on the federal level to regulate pen-
sion funds through the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
(WPPDA)." However, WPPDA's reliance on pension plan ben-
3 M. at 18.
'Id. at 19.
Private Noninsured Pension Funds, /972, 32 SEC SPAT. BULL. 283 (1973)
[hereinafter Private Funds].
Murray, Pensions and Public Policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF FIRST ANNUAL. CORPORATE
PENSION FUND SEMINAR 41 (1964).
' See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402 (a)(1), (2), (5), 404(a)(1) & 501(a).
8 See id.	 401(a).
A pension plan's tax exemption can be withdrawn if those charged with the
management of the plan engage in any transactions prohibited by § 503 of the Code.
See Note, 88 H ARV. L. REV. 960, 960-61 (1975) and note 107 infra.
S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973). See also Statements of Hon.
Thomas R. Donahue, Ass't Sec'y of Labor for Labor-Mgint. Relations, Hearings on H.R.
5741 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor if the House Comm. on Ed. & Labor, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 51 (1968):
The loss of the tax-exempt status may affect the interest of the par-
ticipants and beneficiaries in the plan more adversely than the interests of
those charged with its administration.
As a practical matter, therefore, the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code have not been adequate to maintain fiduciary responsibility
on the part of persons handling welfare and pension funds.
Id. at 54.
" Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, §§
2-10, 72 Stat. 997, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq. (1975).
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eficiaries to enforce its provisions did not prove effective." Thus,
both federal statutes were generally . inadequate. Additionally, in al-
most every case in which pension plan participants lost their benefits,
the loss was occasioned not because of some violation of federal law,
but rather because of the manner in which the plan was executed with
respect to its contractual requirements of vesting and funding." The
state courts compounded this problem by strictly interpreting pension
plan indentures and by failing to apply liberally the concept of equit-
able relief or to disregard overly technical wording in pension plan
documents." This judicial parochialism decreased the capacity of con-
tract and trust principles, particularly the prudent man standard, to
effectively monitor abuses in the . management of pension fund
assets.''
Congress responded to this situation by enacting the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)." The underlying
purpose of the Act is to insure that employees and their beneficiaries
will not be deprived of benefits anticipated under pension plans." To
accomplish this end, ERISA provides minimum participation and vest-
ing standards," repeals WPPDA," institutes stricter reporting and
disclosure requirements,'" adopts a federal prudent man standard for
fiduciaries, 2 ' establishes minimum funding requiretnents, 22 and
creates a reinsurance program. 2a
In 1965, a comprehensive report to the President on public pol-
icy and private pension programs concluded:
This Committee recognizes the need for additional
measures for the protection of the interests of employees
but doubts whether a major problem is the lack of "ap-
propriate standards of prudence." The chief problem,
rather, is one of enforcing existing standards of fiducial ob-
ligations of trustees .... [P]rivate retirement funds are
especially well suited to be flexible and responsive to chang-
ing investment opportunities.... The question is how to
permit broad exercise of discretion on the part of trustees
or plan managers but to hold them to the highest standards
of fiducial responsibility. Regulations or formulas for asset
12 See text at notes 161-173 infra.
" S. Rs:r. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
"See Levin, Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Log of Pension Benefits, 15 V1LL L.
REV. 527, 566 (1970).
" See text at notes 124-147 info.
" 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1381 (1975).
" 	 § 1001.
/d. §§ 1052, 1053.
§ 1031.
"Id. §§ 1021-31.
21 1d. § 1104.
"Id, §§ 1081-86.
"IA §§ 1301-81.
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management would reduce this flexibility without the
likelihood of improving the quality of the judgment and
discretion exercised by trustees or plan managers. 24
Congress apparently adopted the conclusions of the President's
Report pertaining to investment constraints, for ERISA conspicuously
avoids direct regulatory controls over pension fund investments.
While prohibiting certain transactions between parties in interest and
the trust fund, 25 the legislation generally reaffirms confidence in a
rule of prudence, and effectively federalizes the protections which
have nominally been available at the state level through the law of
trusts." As noted in the Senate Report on ERISA, "[a] fiduciary stan-
dard embodied in federal legislation is considered desirable because it
will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under
the same set of facts may differ from state to state." 27 An implied as-
sumption of the statute appears to be that the failure of state trust law
to adequately safeguard the interests of employees under benefit
trusts resulted from a failure of administration rather than substance.
This assumption, however, is subject to some doubt.
In recognition of the increasingly speculative leanings of pension
fund management since 1965, it does not seem unreasonable to re-
examine the conclusions of the President's Report and the Congress
regarding the undesirability of direct investment restraints. Common
stock holdings, as a percentage of the total assets of private non-
insured pension funds, rose from 54.8 percent in 1965 to 73 percent
in 1972. 28 Moreover, asset managers and corporate trustees have
demonstrated an increasing interest in portfolio performance. Indeed,
the investment potential of pension funds has generated an entire
"mini industry" of pension managers, advisory firms, actuaries and
performance measurement services. 29 Finally, the effects of inflation-
ary pressures and collective bargaining demands on the costs of estab-
lishing and maintaining a pension plan have also encouraged em-
24 PRESIDENTS COMMITEEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE
RETIREMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 73-74 (1965).
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106.
"See id. §§ 1103-14. See text at notes 90-147 infra.
"S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973).
"See Private Funds, supra note 5, at 286 (Table I). Private, non-insured pension
funds owned $46 billion of common stock at the end of 1969 compared with less than
$11 billion in 1960. Hearings on Investment Policies of Pension Funds Before die Subcomm. on
Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970) [hereinafter In-
vestment Policies]. During 1969, the assets of private, non-insured pension funds in-
creased by $7 billion, which included a record $5 billion increase, up I1% from the
previous year, in holdings of common stock. Id. at 27. These percentages are based on
the aggregate market value of securities held in private pension portfolios as set forth
in Private Funds, supra note 5, at 286 (Table I). An even more dramatic increase ap-
pears if book value is used as a measure: 42.4% in 1965 and 63.3% in 1972. Id.
"For an overview of the pension fund "industry," see Institutional Investor, vol.
V, No. 9 (August 1971).
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players and corporate trustees to pursue profitable investments and
emphasize high returns. 30
In light of this current trend ,in pension fund management, a
serious question arises as to whether the enactment in ERISA of a
federal fiduciary standard to monitor the investment of pension fund
assets adequately responds to the needs addressed by the Act or fully
reflects the values it endorses. It is the purpose of this study to
evaluate ERISA by examining the federal fiduciary standard. In this
regard, mechanical aspects of pension plans which have proven par-
ticularly conducive to abuse will first be discussed; historical develop-
ments which have hastened this inherent potential for abuse will be
highlighted. Both state and federal attempts at pension plan regula-
tion prior to ERISA will then be examined in an attempt to ascertain
the significance and capabilities of ERISA's provisions. It will be sub-
mitted that by failing to adopt a more explicit standard for the in-
vestment of pension funds than that which previously existed under
state law and by relying on the initiative of individual employees to
enjoin wrongdoing, the Act retains the most basic shortcomings of
prior law. Thus, it will be concluded that the Act's ultimate signifi-
cance lies in its capacity to mitigate the consequences of pension fund
failure, rather than to eliminate the causes.
I. THE PENSION PLAN
As defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, an "employee pension benefit plan" is
[Aftly plan, fund or program, which was heretofore or is
hereafter established or maintained by an employer or an
employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances
such plan, fund, or program—
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) results in a deferral of income by employers for
periods extending to the termination of covered employ-
ment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating
the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculat-
ing the benefits under the plan or the method of distribut-
ing benefits from the plan. 3 '
The basic concept of a pension plan, consists of an employer's promise
of retirement income to each employee who meets specific criteria of
eligibility.
There are two basic types of pension plans recognized by the
"See Investment Policies, supra note 28, at 28.
a 29 U.S.C.A. 1002(2).
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Act—the defined contribution plan 32 and the defined benefit plan."
Either type may require employee as well as employer contributions.
However, in the defined contribution plan the rate or amount of em-
ployer contributions for each employee is fixed. 34 The employee's ul-
timate benefit thus depends upon the amount contributed and upon
the fund's rate of return." In contrast, under a defined benefit plan,
the employee's pension is fixed in advance by a benefit formula and
does not depend upon fund performance." Thus, the contributions
of the employer must be sufficient to meet the liabilities of the fund."
Many employers provide their employees with a defined benefit plan
and a supplementary defined contribution plan.
In 1973, more than half of the industrial work force participated
in private pension plans. 38 Despite their variety of form, the great ma-
jority of retirement plans are shaped by the qualification requirements
of section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. In fact, a survey of
private pension plans on file in 1970 revealed that nearly all met the
Code's standards for exemption." Tax inducements," however, are
not the sole explanation for the current rise in the number of pension
plans.'" Where plans are sponsored by employers, pension benefits
serve to increase the productivity of the employee group—retirement
security boosts employee morale and enables employers to attract and
retain better executives." Within the broad requirements of section
40l(a) of the Code, private pension plans are fashioned to meet the
32 Id. 	 1002(34). Department of Labor statistics indicate that there were 250,000
defined contribution plans in operation during 1974. 120 CONC. REC. 16552-53 (daily
ed. Sept. 12, 1974).
33 29 U.S.C.A. 1002(35). There were 100,000 defined benefit plans in existence
in 1974. 120 CONC. REC. 16553 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1974).
34 29 U.S.C.A. 	 1002(34).
55 Id.
"Id. 	 1002(35).
3 ' /d. tfl 1081-86.
38 See Pension Reform Act, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, No. 8A, at 290 (Sept.
20, 1974). Private pension coverage is not universal. Although coverage is impressive in
the industrial labor force, surveys within the last decade indicate that approximately
half of the nonagricultural work-force does not now participate in pensions. Rolnick,
Public Policy with Respect to Vesting and Funding of Private Pension Plans, in N.Y.U.
TWENTIETH ANNUAI. CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 369, 371 (1968); H.R. REP. No. 93-779, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 11 (1974). Furthermore, many industrial firms still do not have re-
tirement programs and in those which do, not all employees are participants. See HOUSE
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON GENERAL TAX REFORM, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1130 (1973) (remarks of Prof. Daniel Halperin).
35 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF 'THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBI.IC WELFARE,
STATISTICAL. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE PENSION PI.ANS. 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1972) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ANALYSIS].
" See text at notes 115-23 infra.
" As of June, 1970, only 34,000 plans were on file with the Department of
Labor. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, sufra note 39, at I.
'IC/ Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
909, 917 (1970) [hereinafter Retired Worker). An employer may also secure other advan-
tages by providing a pension fund, e.g., longevity of service not otherwise assured the
employer and easier retirement and replacement of super-annuated employees. Id.
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needs and resources of each particular employment relationship. The
employer determines not only how much he or she is willing and able
to contribute toward a pension plan, but also whether the plan should
be contributory or non-contributory. The employer also decides upon
the coverage and benefits of the plan and chooses between alternative
funding agencies. This flexibility in design and the variability of fi-
nancial and industrial needs have generated a vast array of pension
plan arrangements.
Pension plans may be organized on either a multi-employer or a
single-employer basis." Under multi-employer plans," a common rate
of contribution is established for all participating employers, and a
single pooled fund is created which in turn disburses benefits to all
employees covered by the plan." Participating employers generally
benefit from a reduction in costs due to economies of scale. Where
multi-employer plans are subject to the provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act, which is usually the case in plans negotiated through collective
bargaining," a joint board of trustees manages the pension trust."r In
such cases, the potential for overreaching and self-dealing by the em-
ployer in the administration of the pension plan is greatly reduced.
Moreover, the structural characteristics of the multi-employer
mechanism make it unlikely that employee pension benefits will be
destroyed by the business failure of any single employer."" In fact,
"[the sole] vulnerable feature of the pooled fund is in a formula of
financing ... which, in effect, ties contributions to the aggregate level
of employment .... 40 In this respect, the plan does create a great
deal of uncertainty concerning the benefit levels which a pooled fund
can support. Nevertheless, the negligible incidence of benefit loss in
the operation of multi-employer plans 5" and the participation of
"a D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 52 (2d ed. 1964).
44 A multi-employer plan is defined as a plan which covers the employees of two
or more financially unrelated employers. TERMINATIONS, Mira note 2, at 66.
"See S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1956). These so-called "fixed-
contribution" plans prescribe employer contributions based on a specific formula, e.g., a
percentage of payroll or cents per man-hour, /d. See taw Isaacson, Employee Welfare and
Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection of Einployee Rights, 59 CoLum, L. Rti.v. 96, 100
(1959). Benefits payable to participants are generally formulated fro in time to time by
the trustees, usually with die advice of actuaries. (7/. id. at 101.
"See Goetz, Developing federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 911(1970); Levi,,, supra note 14, at 528; Retired Worker, supra note 42,
at 919, 921. For a detailed discussion of the scope and nature of the bargaining obliga-
tion, see Goetz, Pension Plans and Labor Law, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 738.
''Retired Worker, supra note 42, at 909. See also S. REr. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1956).
"See Tilove, Multi-Employer Pension Plans, in N.Y.U. SEVENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 639, 649-50 (1954).
40 Barbash, The Structure and Evolution. of Union Interests in Pensions, in STAFF OF
SUBCOMM, ON FISCAL POLICY OF tuE ,JoINT ECONOMIC COMM., OLD AGE INCOME.
ASSURANCE: A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON PROBLEMS AND POLICY ISSUES IN 'rite Puluic
AND PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. IV 60, 81, (Comm. Print 1967).
5 " Between 1965 and 1971 only 674 employees covered by only 5 plans lost ben-
efits. This represented less than .01% of the total number of participants in all multi-
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union representatives in the investment of funds and the distribution
'of benefits generally make these pension arrangements economically
stable and, as such, poor examples of the risks and abuses presently
under examination.
Single-employer plans, 5 ' especially where unilaterally established,
better illustrate the threats to retirement security which inhere in the
current operation of private pension plans. The employer's discretion
regarding the management of trust assets is greatest under these
plans." To be sure, as the proportion of collectively bargained plans
increases, employee representatives will intensify their demands for a
greater voice in the administration of pension plans, and the risks of
employer self-dealing will diminish. Yet even where the plans are so
negotiated, there is "considerable evidence" that the administrative
problems inherent in pension plan administration may convince some
unions to permit management to control the plans and the investment
of the pension funds. 53
One aspect of pension plans which is shaped by the Code is the
use of a funding agency distinct from the employing firm. This sepa-
rate agency is mandatory under the Code before the employer may
qualify for the tax advantages of maintaining a pension plan." Fund-
ing typically occurs either through the purchase of an annuity con-
tract from an insurance company or through the establishment of a
trust. 55 In trust-funded plans, the trust receives contributions which
are invested in securities and other assets. 56 Management has favored
these plans because of their numerous cost advantages. One such ad-
vantage is that under a trusteed plan, investment income, which re-
duces contributions necessary to fund defined benefits, 57 is potentially
higher because pension law limits on investments in common stock are
less restrictive than state laws governing insurance companies."
employer plans in 1971, TERMINATIONS, supra note 2, at 3-4.
"'Single-employer plans represent three-quarters of all private pension plans.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 71.
" In 1971, nearly 90 percent of all single-employer plans were employer-
administered. TERMINATIONS, supra note 2, at 67-68.
53 Barbash, supra note 49, at 88.
m INT. REV. CODE or 1954, *401(a).
"Cf. S. R,,. No, 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1956). See also Kearshes,
Methods of Funding in Pension Planning: The Tnatee Plan, in N.Y.U. TENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE. ON LABOR 205, 207-08 (1957).
'6 Id.
55 Kearshes, supra note 55, at 214. In an ordinary - trust-funded pension plan,
current contributions will be greater than currently payable benefits for a number of
years. Excess contributions are required to he invested in safe but productive assets, and
earnings on investtnents serve to reduce the present cost to the employer of future
benefits. Id. Interest earned on investment is one of the actuarial assumptions included
in the cost formula used to determine a fixed rate of yearly contributions. Melnikoff,
Actuarial Bases: The Interest Rate, in N.Y.U. TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 85,
90, 91 (1957).
8 See J. MELONS & E. ALLEN. JR.. PENSION PLANNING 233 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as MEI.ONE & ALLEN] See also Kearshes, supra note 55, at 214-18. It should be noted,
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Moreover, initial costs are lower, and the avoidance • of certain ad-
ministrative costs included in insurance premiums makes the trust
plan less onerous in the early years."
Trusteed plans, however, are particularly vulnerable to the self-
interested biases of the sponsoring employers. Although trustees of
such plans are normally banks having trust powers, 6 ° there is no legal
obligation that the trustee be a corporate entity unrelated to the com-
pany of the sponsoring employer." Thus, there is nothing to prevent
the employer himself from serving as trustee of the plan. Even where
banks do serve as trustees, there is no legal requirement that the
trustee-bank have unlimited or sole , discretion with respect to the in-
vestment of funds. 62 This again creates a potential for employer in-
fluence in the management of pension funds. Trust-funded plans,
therefore, suffer from disadvantages rare in insured plans—the pos-
sibility of loss from risky investments and of inadequate funding due
to over optimistic actuarial assumptions on the part of sponsoring
employers.
Two-thirds of all private pension plans, covering about 75 per-
cent of all participating employees, are self-administered." In such
cases, a bank typically holds the funds as trustee and the sponsoring
employer administers their investment in accordance with broad dis-
cretion granted under the trust agreement." A trust company or
other corporate trustee is often appointed to accept legal title since
these institutions are generally more experienced with the intricate
requirements of the Code and the disclosure and fiduciary laws." In
the case of unilateral plans—those which are initiated by the
company—employer-appointed committees generally control trust in-
vestment policies." Although the employer may consult professional
investment advisors, it is unlikely that any arrangement will be as
satisfactory to the employer as a corporate trustee and an investment
committee of company officers." Similarly, even where plans are in-
itiated through negotiation with the union, employers almost univer-
sally aim to prevent unions from participating in the investment of
however, that insurance companies, in an effort to retain a competitive position in the
pension field, have successfully obtained legislative authority in a large number of states
to segregate assets held in connection with pension plans and to invest those assets in
common stocks. Id. See also 1 CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE 1 719 at 2078-79 (1975).
3° E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 419 (1972). See also Kearshes, supra note 55, at 213-14.
°° Kearshes, supra note 55, at 209.
31 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 401(a).
§ 401(a).
33 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS. supra note 39, at 31.
64 See Retired Worker, supra note 42, at 909; 917-18; cf. Kearshes, supra note 55, at
209.
66 Kearshes, supra note 55, at 209, 210.
°° See I CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE 9 1062 (1975).
" Note, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1230, 1231-32 (1965).
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pension reserves and, in most cases, have succeeded in doing so." In
fact, management's own argument for withholding power over in-
vestment of pension funds from the union is that these funds ought
to be placed beyond the political control of the union and that the
principal ought to be protected from unwise speculation in union
hands. 69
Employer-managed pension plans thus possess a potential for
conflicts of interest due to the degree of employer control over the
investment of pension funds. The problem is greatest in unilaterally
established pension plans, where the tendency toward financial inte-
gration of the concerns of the plan and those of the company is
unavoidable." The lack of adequate supervision due to the absence of
the contractual restraints of collective bargaining frees an employer to
approach his investment responsibilities in a far less conservative
manner. Moreover, pension trust instruments which generally au-
thorize broad investment discretion on the part of the trustee accom-
modate, if they do not actually encourage, a degree of laxity in fund-
ing discipline which may adversely affect the benefit expectations of
the participants by later causing financial difficulties for the plan.
The increasing costs of pension plans inevitably influences em-
ployer decisions in the investment of pension funds. Choice of the
funding agency, determination of the annual contribution rates, in-
vestment of pension fund assets, and actuarial assumptions, where
dependent upon the fluctuating financial condition of the employer,
inevitably reflect the changing needs of the sponsoring company to
reduce its expenses. Indeed, the efforts of investment managers to
minimize the costs of pension plans for their sponsoring employers
appears to be the crux of the problem of pension plan security. 7 ' Ex-
cessive risk-taking in the investment policies of employer-managed
funds inevitably endangers pension benefits in a manner unperceived
by the beneficiaries of the plan. Employees regard pensions as an in-
surance mechanism, and although they often challenge the adequacy
" James, Manipulation of a Joint Pension Board for Power Purposes: The Teamster Ex-
perience, in N.Y.U. TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 381, 390 (1968).
One author states that a union's right to control the investment of pension funds
is not at all certain where the competing ownership claims to the funds, in themselves,
are subject to doubt. Harbrecht, Union Participation in the Investment of Pension Funds, in
N.Y.U. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 385, 386 (1961). He adds that the
union does have a legitimate right to bargain over investment policy. Id.
" It appears, however, that union participation on trustee boards, where it does
exist, exerts a highly conservative influence. Harbrecht, supra note 68, at 391. Union
leaders often insist that funds be placed in government bonds or government insured
mortgages in order to secure the principal. Id.
° See STATisTicAt, ANAissiS. supra note 39, at 31.
1 ' "Pension fund managers need to be concerned with earning an adequate re-
turn on pension fund assets, since high return reduces the cost of a dollar's worth of
pension payments." Investment Policies, supra note 28, at 152. In quantitative terms, it has
been noted that "a one percent difference in yield earned on pension fund assets means
roughly a 20-25% difference in ability to pay benefits, or in the employer's cost of pay-
ing them." Id. at 123, citing M. Bernstein, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 41 (1964).
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of benefits under the plan, they rarely question the ultimate existence
of those benefits. Such reliance may be misplaced. 72
The speculative trend in pension fund investment, evidenced by
increasing proportions of common stock ownership, has been in re-
sponse to the steady increase in the cost of retirement programs and
the concurrent institutionalization of private pension plans in the em-
ployment context." Initially, the restricted size and scope of non-
insured plans guided their investment along traditional trust lines."
Thus, pension funds were customarily invested in publicly-issued,
high-quality bonds. 75 Moreover, industrial companies would fre-
quently include restrictions in their pension trust agreements which
limited the investment of pension funds to those securities in which
life insurance companies or trust fiduciaries under New York law
were legally authorized to invest." However, in the late 1940's, with
government bond yields pegged at 2 percent, equities became more
attractive for current income. 7 7 The post-war easing of restrictions on
insurance companies and savings banks facilitated analogous changes
in the trust laws and made it possible for trust fiduciaries to invest
substantial proportions of trust portfolios in equity securities."
Qualitative changes in pension fund investment policy occurred
gradually, following the growth in pension fund assets' and the mount-
ing costs of retirement benefits. Total estimated assets of pension
plans grew from $2.4 billion in 1940 to more than $150 billion in
1973, and accumulations are projected to exceed $250 billion by
1980. 7 " Originally content to invest their capital in relatively safe,
low-return investments, pension futid managers became more and
more willing by the late 1950's to take higher risks in the expectation
of larger returns." As it became increasingly clear that a company
creating a pension plan was funding a future income benefit—one
necessarily determined by a standard of living which the employee
would be enjoying at the time of retirement—companies had to adjust
72 See Investment Policies, supra note 28, at 27: "1 believe there are serious dangers
if people seeking retirement income are led., to believe that investments in common
stocks are essentially equiValent to fixed income securities, but simply offer a much
higher rate of return."
" This historical summary of pension fund investment policies relies on a more
detailed and comprehensive account by Murray, Economic Aspects of Pensions: A Summary
Report, in STAFF OF •SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF 'FHE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,
OLD AGE INCOME ASSURANCE: A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON PROBLEMS AND POLICY ISSUES
IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., DI. 5, at 82 (Comm.
Print 1967).
" Id. at 81.
72 Id.
'6 Id. at 82.
" Id.
79 S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).
8 " Cf: Investment Policies, supra note 28,. at 142: The traditional investments of
pension funds—bonds and mortgages—have not been able to keep up in performance
with alternative investments in equities during prolonged periods of inflation."
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from the concept of satisfying a fixed commitment to one of satisfying
not only commitments already made but also others likely to arise in
the future." Hence, substantial emphasis on pension fund perfor-
mance developed, which increased the role of equity in pension port-
folios.
It may be true that "[n]otwithstanding [the] risk, intelligent in-
vestment in common stocks provides a means by which a trustee can
maintain the purchasing power of a trust estate and participate in
general economic growth."" Nevertheless, risk considerations are not
so easily dismissed. If, as one author suggests, "Mt is safe to conclude
that the activities of corporate trustees are directed solely toward ob-
taining the maximum return on the funds entrusted to them consis-
tent with a high degree of risk, [while] adhering to the rule that the
trustee is primarily a conserver ... ,"83
 it seems but a short step in a
unilaterally established, self-administered plan to adopt an aggressive,
performance-oriented investment policy in which evaluations of risk
are all but absent. The extreme example would be the investment by
an employer-manager of the bulk of pension fund assets in his own
securities. Doubtless such manifest self-dealing would be prevented,
even by the coarse web of legal constraints which currently exists."
Less blatant, but equally threatening to retirement expectations, is the
investment by an employer-manager of the bulk of the portfolio in
high-risk, high-return equity securities. Such investments might seem
reasonable from the perspective of an employer attempting to reduce
costs through the investment- return on the fund. This is especially
true in light of the fact that if a pension plan fails to the extent that it
cannot meet its pension commitments,.the employees, rather than the
employer, bear the loss." On the other hand, the quality of an in-
Pension plans are often amended to increase accrued benefits payable on re-
tirement and to adjust benefit formulas prospectively to reflect inflationary movements
and changes in the cost of living. See Goldstein, Inflation and Deflation in Pension
Planning, in N.Y.U. TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 223, 229-30 (1957).
Moreover, many benefit formulas are initially based on the retiring employee's monthly
income just prior to retirement. Id. at 228-29.-The impact of this "escalation effect,"
namely, the need to increase future benefits due to inflation, is most severe under plans
in which benefits are based on the final earnings of the employee. Investment Policies,
supra note 28, at 155. In this situation, an employee's benefits, paid with regard to his
work for perhaps 40 years, depend upon his salary level between the ages of 60 and 65.
Id. While actuaries are capable of predicting an average employee's salary advancement,
it is almost impossible to predict general salary levels 40 years into the future. Id. For a
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages - of these provisions, which are often
called "final-pay" provisions, see Melone, supra note 58, at 34-35.
" Note, Common Stocks in Trust, 113 U. PENN. L. REV. 228, 230 (1964).
" P. HARBRECHT. PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 101 (1959).
" g 2 A Scour, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170.15, at 1339-41 (3d ed. 1967).
es quest for high yield is attended, as always, by commensurate risks.
The price of failure can be a fund's [inability] to meet its pension
commitments—a loss presumably to be borne not by administrators or
money managers but by beneficiaries who share the losses and not the
gains.
Hearings on Investment Policies of Pension'Funds Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the
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vestment to the beneficiary is a function of profitability discounted by
risk. This situation clearly suggests that a beneficiary's interest, where
retirement security is at stake, is inadequately protected.
11. PENSION PLAN REGULATION PRIOR TO ERISA
Before examining in detail the conflict of interest problems in-
herent in employer management of pension funds, and the limits of
the system of disclosure coupled with a fiduciary standard established
in the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 8" it is useful to ex-
amine the state and federal regulations which governed the invest-
ment of pension funds prior to passage of the Act.
A. Internal Revenue Code of 1954
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the Code exerted indirect con-
trol over pension funds by granting tax benefits to funds that com-
plied with conditions specified in section 401(a) of the Code. Because
the Code provisions were not repealed by ERISA, these tax benefits
are still available. If a pension plan qualifies under the Code, the em-
ployer can deduct contributions to the plan as ordinary and necessary
business expenses at the time the contributions are made. 87 Moreover,
employer contributions are not includable in the taxable income of
participating employees until actually received," and in some cases
benefit distributions will be taxed to the employees at capital gains
rates."" Finally, investment earnings on funds accumulated under
trust-funded plans are exempt from taxation"" unless they constitute
"unrelated business income.""'
To qualify for this preferential tax treatment, the plan is re-
quired to meet all of the conditions specified in section 401(a). The
plan has to be written," permanent, and intended for the exclusive
benefit of employees and their beneficiaries." It cannot be possible
under the trust agreement for any part of corpus or income to be di-
Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Investment
Policies]. See text at notes 180 &I82 infra.
" 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-31, 1104-14 (1975).
87 I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(1).
" Id, § 402(a)(1).
89 Id. §§ 402(a)(2), 402(a)(5). Basically, lump sum distributions of benefits payable
to the employee, if made within one year of the employee's death or other "separation
from ... service," are taxable at capital gains' rates to the extent that the amount of
such distributions exceeds the employees own Contributions.
" Id. § 501(a).
"' Id. § 501(b). "Unrelated business income" is defined in §§ 512 and 513(b) of
the Code. Generally, income derived from any "trade or business" regularly carried on
by a pension trust exempt under § 401 will be deemed unrelated business income and
will be taxable under § 511.
" Id. § 401(a).
93 Id. § 401(a)(2).
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verted to any other use prior to the satisfaction of employee claims. 94
The plan cannot discriminate in favor of highly-compensated em-
ployees, officers, stockholders, or supervisory personne1, 95 and it is
required to benefit a minimum percentage of all employees. 96 The
plan is also required to guarantee certain non-forfeitable benefits in
the event of termination, and toprovide that upon termination or
upon complete discontinuance of contributions, participating em-
ployees will have immediate vested rights to benefits which are ac-
crued and funded. 97 Finally, the pension plan is required to provide
that benefits will be determinable and that forfeitures will not be ap-
plied to increase the benefits which any remaining employees would
otherwise receive under the plan."
The Code, however, does not attempt to dictate the manner in
which pension funds should be invested. No specific limitations are set
forth in section 401(a) with respect to investments which can be made
by the trustee of a qualifying trust. Generally, contributions can be
used by the trustee to purchase any investments permitted by the
trust agreement to the extent allowed under local law." This broad
license is narrowed only by the requirement, provided in section
401(a)(2) of the Code, that trust funds be used solely for the exclusive
benefit of the employees and their beneficiaries.'" The Service has
indicated that an investment will generally satisfy the "exclusive
benefit" requirement if the following standards are met: (I) the cost
of the investment must not exceed its fair market value at the time of
purchase; (2) the investment must provide a fair return commensu-
rate with the prevailing rate; (3) sufficient equity must be maintained
to permit distribution in accordance with the terms of the plan; and
(4) the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would adhere
to must be present.'
These standards, however, have proved to be unenforceable, ex-
cept in the most flagrant instances of abuse. An example of such fla-
grant abuse arose in Rev. Rul. 73-532 where the Service was pre-
sented with an employees' trust agreement which provided the trustee
with "complete power to invest trust funds without regard to whether
investments may be new, speculative, hazardous, adventurous, or pro-
ductive of income.""" The Service held that the trust was not de-
signed for the "exclusive benefit of the employees" and thus did not
qualify under section 401(a).' 13 However, in the great majority of
" Id.
" Id. § 401(a)(4).
"Id. § 401(a)(3).
"Id. § 401(a)(7).
" Id. § 401(a)(8).
" Treas. Reg. 	 1.401-1(b)(5)i (1972).
I" Imr. REV. CODE (Jr 1954, 401(a)(2).
"' Rev. Rul. 73-380, 1973-2 Corn. Bull. 124, 125; Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 Cum.
Bull. 88. See also IRS l'unicATioN 778 (1972).
1 " Rev, Rul. 73-532, 1973-2 Cum. Bull. 128.
1 ° 3 1d. at 129.
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cases, where the terms of the trust are more reasonable and the in-
vestment behavior of the trustee less extreme, the Service has been re-
luctant to enforce sanctions against plans in questionable compliance
with the standards.," This reluctance is due to the fact that under the
Code, the only sanction for breach of this fiduciary standard is dis-
qualification of the entire plan. 115 Even where the trustee has engaged
in transactions specifically prohibited under the Code,'" the Service
has been unwilling to revoke the trust's tax exemption because of the
sudden and drastic effect that such a sanction would have upon the
employees.'" Clearly, departure from the general investment
guidelines offers no greater reason for revoking qualification. In any
event, it is unlikely that sporadic IRS audits of trust investments
would serve as adequate enforcement, even if the standards were en-
forced.
In addition, the "exclusive benefit rule" conflicts with a feature
inherent in the operation of pension plans: a fiduciary who success-
fully invests pension funds benefits both the employer and the em-
ployees. The income earned on trust investments does not redound to
the exclusive benefit of the employees, and the Code has never been
read so literally as to require such a result. The Service has stated that
the rule "does not prevent others also drawing some benefit from a
transaction with the trust" and that it is the "primary purpose of benefit-
ing employees" which must be maintained with respect to
investments.'" Thus modified, the section 40I(a)(2) standard estab-
lishes a test of fiduciary responsibility no more rigorous than that
which already existed under the prudent man standard. As a practical
matter, the threat of disqualification for imprudent investments has
exerted only slight. influence on pension investment policy.'"
Furthermore, it is at least arguable that two deficiencies in the
Code's funding requirements have encouraged an illusory security
and a misplaced reliance on the part of employees. Originally, pen-
sion funds were established as balance sheet reserves on the books of
sponsoring employers; benefits were expensed as they fell due and no
current provision was made for future costs.'" The Code, however,
contemplates an advance funding process, designed so that accumu-
"See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-65, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 114, 115. See also Pension Reform
Act, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, No. 8A, at 596 (Sept. 20, 1974).
115 See Note, 88 MARV. L. REV. 960, 9004i1 (1975),
I""See INT. REV, CODE OF 1954, A 503.
in Because of the conduct of an employer and trustee, an employee, upon dis-
qualification of the trust, may have to pay a' tax on contributions made on his behalf
long before he receives theta. This possible disadvantage to innocent employees has in-
spired Service reluctance to impose the sanctions. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1973).
"' H Rev. Rul. 73-380, 1973-72 Cum. Bull. 124, 125; Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2
Cum. Bull. 88 (emphasis added).
109 See Hearings on H.R. 5791 Before the Subcomm, on Ed. & Labor of the House
Committee on Ed & Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess: at 54 (1968) (remarks of Sen. ,Davits).
"" P. H A RBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 6 (1959).
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lated assets will equal all accrued liabilities after a specified period of
time."' While full and immediate funding of all accrued liabilities is
financially the most conservative approach, it requires relatively large
contributions when a plan is first put into operation.'" An alternative
and more typical funding process is that which strives to achieve full
funding over the period of time during which the plan will presuma-
bly be in continuing operation. The ultimate cost of the plan under
this scheme amounts to the sum of the benefits actually paid and the
cost of administering the plan, less income earned on the accumulated
assets during the funding period." 3 Although this process offers less
certainty of benefits, it is also less costly in the early stages.
To be deductible under section 404(a) of the Code, pension
fund contributions must also be "reasonable." ' 4 Deductibility under
section 404(a) is triggered by initial compliance with the requirements
of either section 162 (trade or business expense) or section 212 (pro-
duction of income expense), although deductions prohibited by the
terms of section 404(a) may not be permitted under any other Code
provision.'" Section 404(a) establishes limits for maximum deductions
rather than standards for minimum contributions. These maximum
deduction limits are designed to curtail manipulation of the tax ben-
efit to employers in years of high income.'" While these limits im-
plicitly define employer contributions deemed necessary to fund pen-
sion benefits, minimum funding requirements themselves are not ex-
plicitly set forth in the Code.
Instead, standards of reasonable funding are nestled in rulings
and regulations concerning disqualification of plans by virtue of
termination.'" Under these standards, termination of a pension plan
will ordinarily occur upon the complete discontinuance of the
employer's contributions."B Where, however, contributions to a qual-
ified plan are sufficient to pay the liabilities created currently (the
"normal costs" of pension payments) as well as the interest due on un-
1 " See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(1)(A).
"' While benefits earned after inception of a plan may be funded as they accrue,
a substantial unfunded liability is often created when the plan is initiated by granting
employees either full or partial credit for earlier service. DEPARTMENT or THE TREASURY
AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STUDY OF PENSION PLAN TERMINSTIONS, 1972: FINAL REPORT
34 (1973) [hereinafter TERMINATIONS]; Beier, Terminations of Pension Plans: Eleven Years'
Experience, 90 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 26, 28 (lune, 1967).
" 3Tilove, The Organization of a Pension Plan, in N.Y.C. TENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 55. 71-72 (1957).
14 In no case is a deduction allowable under section 404(a) for the amount
of any contribution for the benefit of an employee in excess of the amount
which, together with other deductions allowed for compensation for such
employee's services, constitutes a reasonable allowance for compensation
for the services actually rendered.
Treas. Reg. 	 1.404(a)-1(a)(4)(b).
"e See Pension Reform Act, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, No. 8A, at 399 (Sept.
20, 1974).
"' See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c).
18 See Treas. Reg. rAo 1-6(3)( 1),(2).
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funded accrued liabilities (the "past service costs" of pension
payments),"" an employer's suspension of contributions will not con-
stitute a discontinuance and the plan will retain its qualification."' In
some cases, "[a] complete discontinuance of contributions may occur
although some amounts are contributed by the employer if such
amounts are not substantial enough to reflect the intent on the part of
the employer to continue to maintain the plan."'" While obliquely
mandating a minimum contribution schedule, this standard offers lit-
tle certainty that promised benefits are in fact adequately funded. The
requirement of contributions tends to keep the amount of unfunded
liabilities from growing larger. Nevertheless, there is no legal compul-
sion to amortize the principal amount. This deficiency in itself poses a
serious threat to the retirement security of elderly employees, many of
whose service credits accrued prior to the establishment of the plan.
More significant from the perspective of trustee investment pre-
rogative is the absence of any explicit requirement that an employer
increase his or her current contributions to reflect investment losses
("experience losses"). Revenue Bulletin 57-550 122 specifically permits
the relegation of such losses to "past service costs."'" This license ef-
fectively enables the employer to shift the risk of loss on all trust in-
vestments to the employees, and leads to the conclusion that consider-
ations of tax avoidance and not of adequate funding motivated the es-
tablishment of the Code's scattered funding standards.
B. Trust Law
While the preferential treatment afforded under section 401 of
the Code to qualifying pension trusts exerted indirect control over
pension funds, the creation and administration of trusteed plans re-
mained subject to the state law of trusts. A trust is defined as a
fiduciary relationship in which a trustee holds legal title to property
subject to the equitable obligation to conserve the principal for the
benefit of the trust's beneficiaries. 12" The duties of the pension plan
trustee depend primarily on the terms of the trust,'" and these are
ordinarily enforceable in a court of equity.'" Where the trust instru-
ment is silent, state statutory provisions and case law govern the
1 " Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c)(2)(ii). See also IRS Guides on Plan Termination, IRS
PUBLICATION 778, Part 6(d)(1) (1972).
"° Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c). "Unfunded accrued liabilities" result from service
credits attaching to services performed prior to the establishment of the plan. See note
112 supra. They also include the value of any future benefits, attributable to adjust-
ments in the coverage and benefit structure of the plan, which relate to such past ser-
vice.
I" Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c)(I).
192 Rev. Rul. 57-550, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 266.
123 Id. at 267.
124 1 A. Scutt supra note 84, § 2.3, at 37-38.
1 " I id, § 4, at 46; 2 id.	 164, at 1254; 2 id. § 164.1, at 1257.
122 I id.	 2.7, at 43.
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trustee's rights and responsibilities."'
The general rule is that where the trust assets cannot be applied
immediately or within a short time to the purposes of the trust, the
trustee is authorized and obliged to make the fund productive by
proper investments."' Investment of pension fund assets therefore
existed under general trust principles as an affirmative responsibility
of the trustee. Although it is commonly understood that a trustee
must make the fund productive without improperly risking loss of the
principal," 3 trust law reveals a long-standing ambivalence concerning
the standard of sound discretion against which a trustee's investments
are to be measured.' 30
Parallel standards—one narrow and unequivocal, the other flex-
ible and ill-defined—reflect the historical tension in trust law between
a desire for certainty and a need for discretion. Under the narrow
standard, a trustee may safely invest in the types of investments or the
classes of securities designated by a state statute, unless the trust in-
strument contains prohibitions to the contrary.' 3 ' The avowed pur-
pose of this standard is to protect against dissipation of the trust
property through the trustee's imprudent investments.'" Implicit in
such a statutory scheme is the legislative judgment that only certain
thresholds of risk and return are appropriate where individuals invest
assets which are not their own. Where states articulate such a list of
legal investments, a trustee's fiduciary responsibilities are easily moni-
tored.
Most states, however, rely on statutory or common law notions
of "prudence."' 33 Generally stated, the "trustee is under a duty to
make such investments as a prudent man would make of his own
property having primarily in view the preservation of the estate and
the amount and regularity of the income to be derived."'" Although
the prudent man rule purports to be a detached and objective stan-
dard, the variety of state constructions and the ambiguity of their ap-
plication in particular instances demonstrate the fundamental ob-
scurity of the concept of prudence, except in those cases where the
trustee's conduct borders on outright negligence. 133
1 " 2 id. § 164, at 1254-57; 3 id. § 186, at 1499.
128 2 id. § 181, at 1463; see, e.g., Levin v. Commissioner, 355 F.2(1 987 (5th Cir.
1966).
n° 3 A. Scorr.supra note 84, § 277, at 1805.
"°
' 3 ' Id.
"'In re Michaelson, 162 Misc. 847, 851, 296 N.V.S. 119, 124-25 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
"3 3 A. Sex) rr, supra note 84, § 227, at 1805-06.
1 " The prudent man rule was first articulated by Judge Putnam in Harvard Col-
lege v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830), in the following words:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall con-
duct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe
how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own af-
fairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposi-
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Pension trust indentures generally grant the trustee broad dis-
cretion in his choice of investments, subject to this requirement of
prudence. Even where the trustee's discretion is unqualified, a rule of
prudence has been inferred unless expressly negated by the terms of
the trust.' 36 Pension managers themselves claim to perceive the pru-
dent man rule as a formal restriction on their investment policy.'"
Furthermore, even in those states which have adopted a statutory list
of permissible investments, an operative limiting principle of pru-
dence is reflectecl.' 38 Despite such widespread agreement on the role
of prudence, its translation into a functional standard balancing risk
and return has been inadequate. Doctrinally, a trustee must exercise
the caution in making investments which characterizes a prudent man
who is investing the money of someone else.'" Such a standard at-
tempts to preclude the adventurous leanings often exhibited by peo-
ple, however reasonable, when investing their own property. So long
as risk remains unmeasurable, however, the standard remains unen-
forceable except in cases of flagrant abuse.
The scarcity of reported cases in which the trustees of employee
benefit trusts have been held liable for imprudent investments attests,
in part, to the unenforceable vagaries inherent in such a standard.
Most of the cases which have involved a breach of fiduciary duties
have dealt with matters other than investments, such as administrative
self-dealing and improper delegation of authority. 140 Moreover, a
Lion of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the possi-
ble safety of the capital to be invested.
Id. at 461. The New York Court of Appeals, in King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869), re-
phrased the rule, declaring that the trustee is bound to employ the diligence and pru-
dence that "in general, prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, em-
ploy in their own like affairs." M. at 85-86. Though the phrasing of the rule by the
Massachusetts and New York courts has been quite similar, the rule has been tradition-
ally construed more narrowly in New York. In its present statutory codi lication, the
New York rule iterates a legal list of trust investments and provides that in addition to
these a trustee may invest, at his discretion, up to 50% of the market value of the trust
property in other securities, provided they satisfy the general requirements of pru-
dence. See N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUST LAWS I I-2.2(:0( I) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
"6 See Greenhouse's Trust Estate, 338 Pa. 144, 12 A.2d 96 (1940); Conant v.
Lansden, 341 III. App. 488 (1950), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 409 III. 149
(1951).
'" This Subcommittee finding was helpful in explaining the fact that nearly 40
percent of plans responding to a Senate Subeommittee Study indicated formal restric-
tions on their investment of trust assets. SURCOMM. ON LABOR or THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1972) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS].
138 There is some question as to whether "prudence" requires diversification and
thus by its nature imposes limits on a trustee's power to invest in "legal" securities. See 3
A. SCOPE, THE LAW Or TRUSTS 228, at 1855-59 (3d ed. 1967) and cases cited therein.
Such a conclusion would require that a trustee, even when investing in securities per-
mitted by statute, act with due care and prudence to fully discharge his duty.
1 " 9 Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del, Ch. 123, 126 (1934).
14" Welch, Investment for and Management of Employee Benefit Trusts: Waiver and
Modification of the Prudent Man Rule, 110 TgusTs AND ESTATES 350, 351 (1971), A recent
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truly scientific means of determining levels of risks is required in
order to effectively apply the prudence standard, especially if the
court considers the portfolio as a whole rather than each individual
security. Thus, it is not surprising that the few cases which have sur-
charged trustees for the decline in value of risky investments have not
been able to provide any measure of an appropriate risk level."' In
addition, the increasingly favorable attitude toward investment in
common stock has rendered the definition of "prudent" even more
elusive. Clearly, without standards by which he can judge the riskiness
of his fiduciary's investments, a pension plan participant is ill-
equipped to safeguard his interest in the plan's assets. Whatever the
ultimate probability of achieving such a functional standard, it is ap-
parent that state law has not succeeded. Cases of gross self-dealing
time and again serve as the setting for lofty propositions regarding a
trustee's risk preferences."' However, these doctrinal tenets are of lit-
tle value in the day to day operations of pension fund investments.
Compounding the inability of state trust law to articulate an en-
forceable standard is the frequent uncertainty as to the type of pen-
sion plan arrangement to which the standard applies. The plan may
not have been formally arranged as a trust. In fact, the trust may
have existed only as a funding medium, predicated on a trust in-
denture executed between the employer and a bank. Where this is the
case, some courts have tended to view the employee-beneficiary as
having only contractual rights against the employer and not rights as
a beneficiary of a trust. 143
More inhibiting to the effective application of trust law has been
the use of exculpatory clauses. Employers are generally frustrated by
the limits which the prudent man rule places on the investments of
unilateral, self-administered trusts. Because they often conceive them-
selves as benefactors, employers are naturally resistant to making their
gift twice, as may happen if they are required to recoup investment
losses. Hence, employers frequently insert exculpatory clauses in the
trust indentures freeing themselves, as trustees, from liability for in-
vestment losses unless due to wilful tnisconduct. 144 Courts which
case held that the trustees of a pension trust, who were also directors of the sponsoring
corporation, breached their fiduciary duty by investing nearly the entire trust fund in a
promissory note of the employer's company. Although the trust agreement permitted
trustees to invest in unsecured notes, the court stated that the trustees were to be
judged by a "prudent man" standard, and held that investment in unsecured notes of
the funding corporation constituted manifest self-dealing in violation of that standard.
James Berardi v. W.T. Lane, CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE at 20,151 (App. Div. 1972).
"' See, e.g., Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N.J. Ey. 617 (Ct. Err. & App. 1883) (trustee
surcharged for investing in second mortgages which became worthless).
"' See, e.g., Appeal of Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 187-88, 25 N.E. 99, 99-100
(1890).
"3 See, e.g., Burns v. Winkler, 221 Ga. 285, 288, 144 S.E.2d 337, 338-39 (1965).
14 Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 Cot.ust. L. Rev, 909,
924 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Retired Worker].
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strictly interpreted trust indentures readily enforced such clauses.'"
Finally, even where a cause of action for breach of trust can be
established, not all states provide an adequate remedy. In some states
an employee or a beneficiary of a pension plan may not have the legal
standing to sue an administrator for breach of trust,'" especially
where the employee's rights under the plan have not vested."' Thus,
even if the substantive fiduciary standard were functional, procedural
obstacles would, without reform, prevent the employee from realisti-
cally enforcing his rights under the trust agreement.
C. Section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
Section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act"" is not di-
rectly related to the administration of unilateral, employer-managed
pension plans. Nevertheless, this section illustrates, in the context of
joint-trustee plans, the failure of an implied federal fiduciary standard
to provide effective restraints on investment management. Moreover,
judicial treatment of the responsibilities created by this statute may
foreshadow the judicial reaction to the standard of prudence set forth
in ERISA.
Section 302 was enacted to prevent abuses of employee welfare
funds by union officials.'" The section provides that these funds
must be jointly administered by the employer and the employees.""
'" See, e.g.. Collins v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 217 Ga. 41, 49-50, 120 S.E.2(1
764, 769-70 (1961).
u"See, e.g., Whitley v, Mammoth Life & Accident Ins. Co., 273 S.W.2d 42, 43
(Ky. 1954). See also Retired Worker, supra note 144, at 921;
Where an employer unilaterally introduces a pension program, the
retiree has no problem with standing with respect to the employer, since
the contract embodying the plan is directly between himself and the em-
ployer. Where redress is sought against thenon-employer administrators
of a pension plan, it may, however, be difficult to deal directly with such
administrators since they ordinarily have no formal contractual obligations
with the employer. In such cases, unless a fiduciary duty is found by a
court as between the administrator and the pensioner there would be no
grounds for action on a third-party beneficiary theory.
Id.
”" See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944), in which the
plaintiff-retiree claimed that the pension plan at issue constituted a binding contract. Id.
at 791. The court, however, found that the employee's continuous service for 25 years
immediately prior to retirement was a condition precedent to the employer's obligation
to pay pension benefits. Id. The court then held that since there was a three month
break in the employee's 42 years of employment, occurring 10 years prior to his re-
tirement, he had no enforceable right in the pension fund. Id. at 791, 792.
' 4" 29 U.S.C. 186 (1970). For a concise analysis of judicial treatment of section
302, see Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts Under Section 302 of Labor Management Relations
Act, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 719 (1965).
"9 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1947). See also Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, Protecting a Potential
Pensioner's Pension—An Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obliga-
tions and Vesting, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521, 530-31 (1974).
"" 29 U.S.C. 	 I86(c)(5) (1970).
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Section 302(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to make payments
to employees or union representatives except under specified
conditions. 15 ' Section 302(c)(5) exempts from this general prohibition
payments to trust, funds established for the sole and exclusive benefit
of employees, provided, inter alia, that these funds are held in trust
for the purposes of pension - benefits and that the trust agreement is
jointly administered by an equal number of employer and employee
representatives.' 52 Although legislative concern at the time of the
enactment of section 302 centered on union diversion of pension
funds, 153 the statutory solution was similar to the solution offered in
ERISA, namely, the enactment of a federal trust law standard. By in-
cluding in section 302(c)(5) the requirement that a qualifying trust be
for the sole and exclusive benefit of the prescribed class of ben-
eficiaries, Congress effectively federalized the common law proscrip-
tion against breach of trust.
A combination of punctiliousness regarding jurisdictional mat-
ters and awkwardness regarding fiduciary questions has discouraged
the federal courts from enforcing the standards set forth in section
302. More often than not, federal district courts have refrained from
exercising their equity jurisdiction under section 302(e)' 54 when asked
to enjoin questionable uses of trust assets or irresponsible administra-
tive behavior.' 55 This reluctance on the part of the federal courts has
stemmed largely from their concern over improper federal usurpation
of the supervision of trust administration.'" a function traditionally
reserved to state courts of equity.'" Hence, it has been held that
jurisdiction under Section 302(e) is limited to restraining violations of
the basic structural requirements of section 302 and that it does not
extend to fiduciary obligations or standards of prudence in the'ad-
ministration of funds.'"
"I Id. 	 186(a).
"2 M. § 186(c)(5).
''" S. Rm.. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947); SUBCOMM. ON WELFARE AND
PENSION FUNDS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE. WELFARE AND
PENSION "CANS INVESTIGATION. S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1956). See also
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
'" 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1970).
'S5
	
district courts have seen in this section a foundation on which to
rest rather broad powers of policing welfare trust administration. Indeed
we may have contributed to this scattering of cases ....
We are, however, persuaded that the weight of reason and authority
compels it narrow reading of section 302(e).
Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 423-24 (1st Cir. 1968) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (N.D. III. 1971). See also Landau,
Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 149, at 539.
56 See Employing Plasterers' Ass'n of Chicago v. Journeymen Plasterers' Soc'y
Local 5, 279 F.2d 92, 97 (9th Cir. 1960).
'" See text at note 126 supra.
”" E.g., Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1968); Em-
ploying Plasterers' Ass'n of Chicago v. Journeymen Plasterers' Local 5, 279 F.2d 92, 97
(9th Cir. 1960). For a case in which section 302(e) jurisdiction was successfully invoked
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The hesitancy of some federal courts to oversee the operation of
employee benefit funds is also arguably derived in part from an in-
ability to distinguish between those aspects of pension plan adminis-
tration bearing on the "sole and exclusive benefit" of employees pro-
tected by the statute, and those aspects of the operation of trusts
which may be questioned on grounds of non-compliance with the
trust agreement or lack of authority in the trustee. Indeed, one au-
thor has concluded that "[t]he statutory language and the congres-
sional intent suggest the possibility of more extensive review by the
Federal courts of fund activities which are questioned on the basis
that they are not for the 'sole and exclusive benefit of employees.'' ''"a
In any event, section 302 has not generated a substantial body of case
law defining a federal fiduciary standard in the context of pension
trust investment. In fact, section 302(c)(5) has generally been applied
to pension investments only in rare cases of manifest self-dealing
where the court did not have to approach the troublesome issue of
prudence.'"
D. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
Even if trust law as applied to private pension plans had created
strict, readily enforceable fiduciary standards, gaps in the disclosure
requirements of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
(WPPDA) 1 e' would have made detection of improper investments by
participating employees extremely difficult. It is thus not surprising
that the WPPDA was repealed by ERISA.'" Not the least of the
WPPDA's limitations was the narrow scope of its coverage—only plans
with more than twenty-five employees were protected.'" The inade-
quacy of this coverage becomes evident in light of data abstracted
from the termination record files of the Internal Revenue Service,
which indicates that at least two-thirds of all plans which terminated
between 1955 and 1965 covered fewer than twenty-live employees.'"
The WPPDA was also inadequate in its reporting requirements.
Essentially, the WPPDA required two kinds of reports: (1) a descrip-
to review the propriety of trust investments, see In re Bricklayers' Welfare Fund, 159 F.
Stipp. 37 (F.D. Pa. 1958).
15 " Goetz, supra note 148, at 750.
'" See, e.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971), in which it
was held that the intimate relationship between the union's financial activities and the
organizing activities of the trustees compelled the conclusion that the trustees of the
mine workers' welfare fund were acting primarily for the collateral benefit of the union
in making most of their utility stock acquisitions. Id. at 1106. The court held that such
behavior demonstrated overt self-dealing on the part of the trustees and constituted a
breach of trust. Id.
i" 29 U.S.C. 4tl 301-09 (1970).
' 02 29 U.S.C.A.* 1031 (1975).
29 U.S.C.* 303(14(4) (1970).
" 4 Beier, Terminations of Pension Plan Eleven Years' Experience, 90 Mc/snits
LABOR REV. 26, 26 (June, 1967).
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tion of the plan, to be filed with the Secretary of Labor by all sponsor-
ing employers,'" and (2) an annual financial report to be filed within
150 days after the end of the fiscal year by all plans which covered
more than 100 employees.' 66 Although the WPPDA required plan de-
scriptions and financial reports to be "published" for the benefit of
employees, section 307 narrowly defined "publication" as requiring
only that copies be made available in the principal office of the plan
upon the request of a participating employee."' These disclosure
provisions focused largely on the financial status of the plan and
failed to provide employees with information relevant to their protec-
tion in the investment transactions of the fund. Only a summary by
broad portfolio categories was required in the financial statements.' 68
In addition, financial information could be reported at the value used
in feporting to the Treasury or, if such reports were not filed, at the
lower of current value or aggregate cost.'" Thus, there was no
guarantee that annual reports would provide participants with infor-
mation on the current market value of the plan assets. Moreover, the
absence of current reports on cash flow, purchases and sales, and the
market valuation of the portfolio made it virtually impossible to de-
termine a rate of return on investments adjusted to accommodate the
risk of loss.'"
The flexibility of generally acceptable accounting principles did
not contribute to the effectiveness of the WPPDA."' Although com-
panies would be required to disclose the size of unfunded pension
liabilities for vested benefits under those principles, no such general
requirement would extend to the expected liabilities for unvested ben-
efits. As a result, a financial statement setting forth the extent to
which the fund's expected liabilities exceed the fund's assets could be
deceptive, especially where vesting provisions were rather strict.
The failure of the WPPDA was also in part attributable to the
problem of the effectiveness of communication regarding a plan's
contents. As stated by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare: "[A]n average plan participant, even where he has been fur-
nished an explanation of his plan provisions, often cannot com-
prehend them because of the technicalities and complexities of the
language used."'" In addition, the assumptions which employees
bring to participation in pension plans contributed to the WPPDA's
"" 29 U.S.C. § 305 (1970).
166 Id. § 306(a).
§ 307(a)(1).
188 Id. § 30604.
122 1d. § 306 (f)(l)(B).
"° INSTITUTIONAL INVERIOR, VOL V, No. 9,993 (August 1971) [hereinafter
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR].
The Act provides that the information required in 306(b) may be "certified
to by an independent certified or licensed public accountant, based upon a comprehen-
sive audit conducted in accordance with accepted standards of auditing ...." 29 U.S.C.
§ 306(14 (1970).
"2 S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
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failure. No amount of disclosure of the operations of a pension trust
is likely to persuade an employee that he is a trust beneficiary. Em-
ployees relate to the promise of pension benefits as they do to any
other conditions of employment; the imposition of an unintelligible
legal superstructure upon their expectations is thus not apt to alert
them to risks which they do not perceive.
The fundamental weakness of the WPPDA, however, was not in
its specific omissions, but rather in the broad legislative judgment that
disclosure coupled with employee enforcement could effectively
achieve regulatory goals in the area of private pension plans. Wholly
lacking in substantive fiduciary standards, the WPPDA relied on the
initiative of individual employees to discern wrongdoing and to enjoin
it." 3 Experience, however, has borne out the criticism that such re-
liance is unrealistic. Union members are not only reluctant to chal-
lenge their union leaders, but they are also ill-equipped to police their
employers.
Ill. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The conflicts of interest problem inherent in employer manage-
ment of pension funds arises because of two factors: (1) the risk of
loss from unwise investment generally falls upon the employees; and
(2) the benefit from favorable performance on pension fund invest-
ment redounds almost exclusively to the employer. Because of these
two factors, the employer stands with much to gain, but little to lose
in investing pension funds.
That the risk of loss from unwise investment generally falls on
the employee is clear. Funding patterns prior to ERISA suggested
that unless coverage was continued through the transfer of credits to
another pension plan, workers stood to lose between 60 percent and
80 percent of total accrued benefits if their plan terminated in its fifth
year. 14 A Department of Labor study indicates that between 1955
and 1965, pension plans which terminated did, in fact, tend to be rel-
atively new—more than half had been in existence for less than six
years."s
The minimum funding requirements of the Code further con-
tribute to this situation. Under the Code, normal costs must be
funded as they accrue.'" However, a substantial unfunded liability is
usually created when a new plan is established if participants are
given either full or partial credit for earlier service.'" Under the
Code, the employer is not required to fund these past service costs; he
" 3 Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 149, at 547, citing BNA,
FEDERALSTKIE REGULATION or WELFARE FUNDS 58 (rev. 1962); H.R. REI'. No. 998, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1962).
14 Beier, supra note 164, at 26-27.
'"Id. at 30.
"'See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(066.
1 " Beier, supra note 164, at 28.
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can simply pay interest on them."" Moreover, the Code sanctions the
allocation of experience losses to the unfunded past service costs.'"
As a result, it is probable that the assets of a terminating plan will
prove inadequate to satisfy all of the plan's obligations.
Limited liability on the part of the employer also serves to place
the risk of loss from unwise investment on the employee. Most large
plans contain language which has the effect of limiting the employer's
liability to employees to property in the trust fund"" and provisions
permitting the employer to modify the plan at his discretion."' The
trust indenture itself inevitably includes clauses exculpating the trust-
ee from liability for loss or diminution of the fund unless such loss is
caused by the trustee's wilful misconduct.'" The effect of a well-
drawn plan thus is to protect the employer against financial commit-
ments of an unknown magnitude and an indeterminate duration.
This limitation on the employer's liability catalyzes an aggressive man-
agement policy, whereas a cost push merely encourages it. Such a
plan also has the effect of depriving the employees of any real confi-
dence in the employer's promise of retirement benefits. The Code of-
fers some protection to employees covered by terminating unilateral
plans by requiring that all accrued benefits vest upon termination.'"
However, this mandatory vesting was originally of little comfort where
the plan terminated with insufficient funds to provide the expected
benefits. Treasury Regulations mitigate this menace by providing that
a qualifying plan implies a "permanent program."'" Therefore, while
the-employer can reserve the right to change or terminate the plan,
its abandonment for any reason other than business necessity within
too short a time after its creation might result in retroactive
disqualification.'" By threatening an employer with tax disadvantages
the Code diminishes the likelihood of termination. Nevertheless, the
problems of under-funding are still present and the risk of loss is still
upon the employees.'"
Of equal importance in the conflicts of interest problem is the
fact that the benefit from favorable pension fund performance re-
dounds almost exclusively to the employer. The employer's contribu-
18 See Treas. keg. § 1.40 I-6(c)(ii).
17" See it 	 I .401-7(a).
' 8° Beier, supra note 164, at 29. Thus, any deficit in the plan's finances would not
be chargeable against the company's assets in the event of the pension plan's
default—the burden of any asset deficiency would be on the plan's participants. See id.
181 CCU] PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS ANI) CLAUSES 9 94,008, at 209
(1957).
182 See note 144 supra.
1 " 3 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 401(a)(7).
1 " Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10,1(2).
' 8 ' Id.
' s" For brief discussions of the legal environment in which plans are established
and claims are enforced, see B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS or EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS
UNDER PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 107 (1961); Levin, Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Loss of
Pension Benefits 15 VILL L. REV. 527 (1970).
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tion formula is determined on the basis of an actuarial assumption of
fair return on accumulated assets; a higher return than predicted thus
results in temporary "over-funding." Depending on the circumstances,
the Service permits such "experience gains" (actual return in excess of
predicted return) to reduce the costs of the plan either currently or
through one of several spreading methods.'" However, amounts
needed to compensate for experience losses can be added directly to
past service costs, 1 "X and thereby remain permanently unfunded. Such
asymmetrical treatment of experience gains and losses offers no in-
centive at all for conservatism on the part of the employer-trustee.
Indeed, with his costs reduced on the upside and not meaningfully
increased on the downside, his pursuit of more speculative invest-
ments is perfectly rational.
In addition, higher than expected returns create a "surplus" in
the fund equal to the excess of accumulated assets over liabilities. On
termination of the fund, and after satisfaction of all liabilities to em-
ployees, the employer can recover whatever surplus remains, as long
as it arose out of an "erroneous actuarial computation."'" This excep-
tion to the non-diversion rule of section 401(a)(2) of the Code offers a
cost-conscious, performance-oriented investment manager yet another
inducement to seek attractive, high risk-high gain securities. Finally,
the prospect of a steady increase in the cost of retirement programs
also encourages an emphasis on maxiinum return.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that pension funds are in-
creasingly being invested in the stock market. Preoccupation with per-
formance has signaled a move in the direction of high risk-high gain
investments and has drawn attention to the inherent conflicts of in-
terest which exist where an employer retains investment control. 19"
Notions of fiduciary restraint under prior law have been rendered
'"' See Rev. Rul. 59-153, 1959-I Cum. Bull. 89, which discusses pension plans
using the "entry age normal method" where adjustment for gains is generally made by
deducting the amount of gain arising in any year frotn the next year's deductible limit
under section 404(a)(1)(C) of the Code, M. at 90. See also Rev. Rul. 65-310, 1965-2
Cum. Bull. 145, which in some situations permits spreading the adjustments for gain as
all automatic part of current and future normal costs.
"th Rev. Rul. 57-550, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 266, 267.
189 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2. This surplus due to an "erroneous actuarial computa-
tion" must arise
because actual requirements differ from the expected requirements even
though the latter were based upon previous actuarial valuations of
liabilities or determinations of costs of providing pension benefits under
the plan and were made by a person competent to make such determina-
tions in accordance with reasonable assumptions as to mortality, interest,
etc., and correct procedures relating to the method of funding.
"° In a sample of 135 large companies responding to an SEC questionnaire, 110
responded "yes" to the question: "Does the employer attempt to measure the 'perfor-
mance' of any of the plan's manager(s)?" The SEC concluded that this response lent
support to assertions that private plans are becoming increasingly conscious of invest-
ment return on their accounts. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 170, at 1008.
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largely a matter of rhetoric. One experienced pension fund manager
has stated:
[T]he investment manager should determine what type of
boundaries of risk he intends to operate in. The extent of
his own research capabilities is an important factor in mak-
ing this determination and he should not be led into
operating in areas with which he is unfamiliar and where
the degree of risk involved calls for more knowledge and
attention than his organization can successfully produce.'"
However, because risk has remained ill-defined and difficult to meas-
ure, any limitations on investment policy have survived solely by dint
of the administrator's good faith. Insofar as the recent increase in
common stock holdings and annual turnover rates by pension funds
signifies a greater willingness to participate in risky investments, one
must conclude that traditional standards of fiduciary conservatism
have been subsumed by recent conceptions of the more profitable
portfolio.' 92
IV. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974' 93 is the
culmination of a decade of legislative investigations, and three years
of intensive congressional hearings, concerning the administration and
operation of the pension plan system: 94 Underlying ERISA is the in-
tent of Congress to assure that "the equitable character" and "the fi-
nancial soundness" of pension plans be protected "in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries ... . "199 The purpose of the legisla-
tion is thus to ensure that employees will receive anticipated benefits
either when they retire or upon termination of the plan: 96 To
achieve this end, the Act adopts "minimum standards with regard to
participation and vesting."'"
A: Participation and Vesting
Pension plans have traditionally had age and service conditions
that employees were required to meet before they were deemed eligi-
ble to participate in the plan. In the past, only the Code regulated
these conditions by providing that the plan could not discriminate in
m Blanchard, Pension Investment Performance vs. Fiduciary Responsibtity, 110 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 666, 667 (1971).
192 Common stock held by corporate plans increased at a rate of 53.6% from
1964 to 1969; the annual turnover rate went from 7.5% in 1965 to 17.2% in 1969.
INSTITUTIONAL INvEsToa. supra note 170, at 1287.
m 29 U.S.C.A. H 1001-1381 (1975).
m See 119 CONG. REC. 30003 (1973).
IBS 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1975).
196 See id.
197 Id.
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favor of highly-compensated employees, officers, stockholders, or
supervisory personnel.'" The plan was also required to benefit a
minimum percentage of all employees.'" Finally, a plan could qualify
under the Code for tax-exempt status by providing that the rights of
employees in the pension fund vested upon the age of retirement or
upon plan termination?"
ERISA establishes minimum participation and vesting require-
ments for pension plans. Under the Act, any employee who is 25
years of age or over and has completed at least one year of service
must be eligible to participate in the plan,"' although under a de-
fined benefit plan the employer may exclude employees whose age
when hired was within five years of the plan's retirement age. 312 In
addition, if the plan provides that each participant has a right to 100
percent of his accrued benefit after not more than three years of ser-
vice, an employee may be required to complete three years of service
before becoming eligible to participate in the plan. 2 " 3
To satisfy the minimum vesting standards of the Act, a pension
plan must meet one of three schedules. 2 " 4 First, the plan may provide
for full vesting of all benefits after ten years of' credited service."
Second, the plan may provide for 25 percent vesting after five years
of service, with annual accretions of five percent over the next five
years and annual accretions of ten percent over the following five
years?" Finally, the plan may provide for vesting under a "rule of
45," which requires 50 percent vesting of benefit credits for an em-
ployee who has at least five years of service and whose age plus years
of service equal 45. 217 An additional vesting of ten percent annually
over the next five years completes this schedule.'" However, to satisfy
this final alternative, an employee must be 50 percent vested after ten
years of service and receive a ten percent increment in vested rights
each year thereafter. 209 These minimum participation and vesting
standards mandated by the Act deprive the sponsor of the plan of a
great deal of his former discretion in shaping its contours."'
B. Reporting and Disclosure
ERISA repealed the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 2 "
"6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 40! (a)(4).
"9 Id, § 401(a)(3).
S 00 /d. § 401(a)(7).
" 1 29 U.S.C.A. § 1052(a)(I)(A) (1975).
"0 Id. 	 1052(a)(2)(B).
" 3 Id. § 1052(a)( I )(B)(i).
" 4 Id. § I 053(a)(2).
2" Id. 	 1053(a)(2)(A).
206 Id. § I 053(a)(2)(B).
"'Id. § I 053(a)(2)(C)(i).
2 "8 Id.
209 Id. § I 053(a)(2)(C)(ii).
2 " Note, 88 HARV. L. Rev. 960, 963 (1975).
2 " 29 U.S.C.A. § 1031 (1975).
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and established detailed reporting and disclosure requirements. The
Act provides that each pension plan administrator must provide to
each participant and beneficiary a summary description of the plan. 212
The summary must include, inter alia, the requirements of the plan
for eligibility, a description of provisions relating to vested benefits,
the source of plan financing, and the procedures to be followed in
presenting claims for benefits under the plan. 213
 Moreover, the sum-
mary plan description must be "written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the average plan participant, and must be sufficiently
accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants
and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan." 2 “
The plan administrator is also required to provide each partici-
pant and beneficiary with a copy of the statements and schedules
from the annual report, 2 's which must be prepared by an indepen-
dent, qualified public accountant. 213
 The schedules are required to
contain a statement of the assets and liabilities of the plan, aggregated
by categories and appraised at their current value."' The same data
for the end of the previous fiscal year must also be displayed in com-
parative form. 2 ' 8
By setting forth detailed reporting and disclosure requirements,
ERISA fills many of the gaps and omissions that were present in the
WPPDA. Nevertheless, the fundamental weakness of the WPPDA was
resurrected in ERISA, which retains the WPPDA's reliance on the in-
itiative of individual participants to discern and enjoin wrongdoing. 213
C. The Federal Fiduciary Standard
ERISA establishes a federal fiduciary standard for trustees of
pension plans in their dealings with trust property. Under the Act, a
fiduciary is required to administer a pension fund "solely in the in-
terest of the participants and beneficiaries" and for the "exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries
...."22° The fiduciary is required to invest the trust property
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the cir-
cumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims ....2"
1024(b)(1).
" 3 /d. § 1022(6).
2" Id. 	 1022(a)(1).
2 ' 5 /d. § 1024(6)(3).
IO23(a)(3)(A).
" 2 /61. § 1023(b)(3)(A).
216 Id.
"l See note 173 supra.
f0 29 U.S.C.A. §1104(a)(1)(A) (1975).
" Id. II 1104(a)(1)(B).
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The Act further obliges fiduciaries to diversify the investments of the
plan, unless it is clearly prudent not to do so 222 and to act in accor-
dance with the documents that govern the plan, unless it is inconsis-
tent with the Act to do so." 2" The Act also specifically prohibits
fiduciaries from engaging in transactions with parties-in-interest. 224
The Act broadly defines "fiduciary" to include every person who
"exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control" with
respect to an employee benefit fund or who renders, or has the au-
thority or responsibility to render "investment advice for a fee or
other compensation" with respect to the assets of the fund. 225 There-
fore, under the Act, a fiduciary could be a plan administrator, an in-
vestment counselor, a board of individual trustees, or an institutional
trustee. In some instances, the effect of such a broad definition will be
to impose fiduciary duties on numerous persons who would not be
considered trustees under state law.
These significant provisions of ERISA—the federalization of the
prudent man rule, the prohibition against certain transactions, and
the extension of the prudent man rule to persons who have not
heretofore been considered fiduciaries—might appear, at first glance,
to accomplish a significant remedial function.
It is at least arguable, however, that by enacting a federal law of
private pension plans without setting forth a more explicit and en-
forceable federal standard for the investment of pension funds, Con-
gress has failed in its purpose of ensuring anticipated pension ben-
efits. In light of the urgency with which Congress has approached the
statutory reform of private pension plans and the inescapable conflicts
of interest embodied in an employer-managed pension trust, it seems
strange that the Act is silent on the issue of investment limitations.
The Act conspicuously avoids the imposition of specific invest-
ment restrictions on pension fund mangers. It has eschewed articula-
tion of a list of permissible investments. The prudent man standard,
as it has been developed in the state law of trusts, is thus implicitly re-
garded by Congress as sufficient to guard against improper, exces-
sively risky investments on the part of corporate fiduciaries. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether mere federal enactment and broadened
application will instill in the prudent man standard any greater capac-
ity to define investments appropriate for a trust than has been dem-
onstrated at the state level."" This is especially true in light of the
failure of the federal courts to fashion a standard which provides ef-
fective restraints on investment management under the prudent man
rule of section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 227
An implied assumption of ERISA appears to be that the failure
222 	 § 1104(a)(I)(C).
223 Id. § I 104(a)(1)(D).
22.4 1d. § 1106.
ma Id. § 1002(21)(A).
226 See text at notes 129-148 supra.
227 See text at notes 155-160 supra.
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of trust law to safeguard the interest of employees under pension
.plans was a failure of administration rather than substance. This as-
sumption, however, is subject to question. The prudent man rule as
enunciated in ERISA remains as general as state trust law. Neither the
Act nor its legislative history explains how this general fiduciary stan-
dard is to be interpreted. 2" The joint explanatory statement of the
Committee of Conference indicates only that the conferees expect that
the courts will interpret the prudent man rule with a proper regard
for "the special nature and purpose of employees benefit plans."'"
This statement, however, provides little guidance in fashioning a
workable standard. What is the "special nature" of employee benefit
plans? The language employed by the Committee is as general as the
standard itself.
Indeed, it can be argued that the "special nature" of employee
benefit plans works against, rather than in favor of, the application of
the prudent man standard to investment of pension plan funds. The
prudent man rule evolved in response to the traditional tension be-
tween income beneficiaries and remaindermen. 23° Conventionally, the
trustee was required to make a fair and reasonable allocation of trust
property between investments favorable to one or the other of the two
parties. 23 ' Therefore, trust law emphasized a prudent balance be-
tween the preservation of principal and current yield. Because the
remaindermen and the income beneficiaries in a pension trust are the
same person, however, this problem is not faced by the pension fund
investor. 232 Only if the interests of the employer-sponsor and the
employee-participants are genuinely in conflict so as to preserve that
traditional tension can the prudent man rule possess continuing vital-
ity in the pension context. However, an employer managing a pension
trust benefits from favorable performance both in the short run and
in the long run. Like an income beneficiary under a personal trust, an
employer is naturally inclined toward higher current gains at possible
risk to principal in order to minimize current pension costs. As a set-
tlor recovering surplus on termination of the plan, however, the em-
ployer resembles the remainderman whose personal interest in the
remainder might influence him toward adopting a more conservative
investment policy. Therefore, the traditional balance of trust law be-
tween the preservation of principal and current yield may inhere to a
degree in the pension trust, insofar as the employer may play out the
drama himself'. On the other hand, to the extent that an employer,
who has no legal obligation to compensate the fund for investment
losses, 233 sacrifices security and his more remote remainder interest in
In Note, 88 FIARV. L. REV. 960, 964 (1975).
22° S. CONY. REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974).
23° 2 A. SCOFF, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 183, at 1471-72 (3d ed. 1967); 3 id. § 232,
at 1894-96.
231 S id. 232, at 1894-96.
232 P. DIETZ. PENSION FUNDS: MEASURING INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 5 (1966).
233 See text at note 180 supra.
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order to maximize current income, thereby minimizing current costs,
the traditional balance is lost.
A trustee is ordinarily under a duty to invest the trust funds so
that they will be productive of income. 234
 One author notes the ab-
sence of specific language requiring the current production of income
in recent state enactments which attempt to define the pension
trustee's fiduciary responsibility. 235
 He suggests that this may indicate
legislative recognition that employee benefit trusts are different from
ordinary trusts and that there is no particular virtue in income as
compared to capital gain, nor in realized as compared with unrealized
gain. 236
 Based on similar statutory silence in ERISA he also suggests
the possibility.that enactment of a federal prudent man rule intends a
similar modification of the IRS investment guidelines."'
Another problem arises from the fact that trust fiduciary princi-
ples were developed in situations in which the trustee was presumably
independent of the settlor and the beneficiaries. 23" In unilaterally es-
tablished pension plans this is rarely the case. Where the sponsoring
employer dominates the investment powers of the trustee, the trustee
is, by definition, an interested party. Consequently, it is anomalous to
tailor an employer-managed fund to a fiduciary standard requiring
investment for the "sole benefit of the employees." The fact that the
Service has never read the exclusive benefit requirement literally
perhaps signifies an intended revision of ordinary trust law to adapt it
to the peculiarities of pension trusts. 2"
In practice, the relationship between the employer, the trustee,
and the employee appears to preclude the application of flexible
fiduciary principles dependent on the enforcement efforts of vigilant
beneficiaries. The competing interests of life beneficiaries and re-
maindermen under personal trusts motivate these individuals to exer-
cise careful, protective supervision over the investments by the trustee.
The prudent man rule recognizes this fundamental tension and places
definition of the legal standard in the hands of the parties whose in-
terests it purports to protect. It is therefore implicit in the vagueness
of the rule that its effectiveness resides in recognition of these com-
peting interests and establishment of a forum for their resolution.
This approach, however, seems inappropriate where the trust ben-
eficiaries are employees and the provocative tension between income
beneficiaries and remaindermen is absent. The employee's role in the
2" 2 A. SCOTT. SUpra note 230, § 181, at 1463 and cases cited therein.
2" Welch, Investment for and Management of Employee Benefit Trusts, 110 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 350, 352 (1971).
232 1d. at 352, 353.
2 " Id. at 353.
2 " J. Ri .rom:, N. Acsoan, J R., & R. EFFIAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 397
(4th ed. 1971).
2 " The law governing charitable corporations in their investment of endowment
funds presents a comparable development. Like pension funds, endowment funds are
sui generis, necessitating judicial flexibility in the application of ordinary trust princi-
ples. Cary & Bright, The "Income" of Endowment Funds, 69 Comm. L. REV. 396 (1969).
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system of pension trusts is primarily passive. He seldom has any way
of knowing whether or not his interests are being adequately ad-
vanced; he has little comprehension of the information that would
enable him to activate a fiduciary standard in restraint of the fund
manager. This recognition may conduce to the conclusion that unila-
teral plans must be administered by an independent trustee if
"fiduciary responsiblity" and "exclusive benefit" are to have any sub-
stance whatsoever.
D. Funding
The failure of ERISA to significantly improve upon the prudent
man rule and to provide an operative norm for investment decision-
making is mitigated, in part, by the mechanical capacity of ERISA to
surcharge a fiduciary for excessive risk.'" ERISA may accomplish—in
the structural relationship between a minimum funding standard, an
excise tax on funding deficiencies, and a reinsurance program—that
which it may prove incapable of accomplishing through the enactment
of a federal prudent man standard.
Under the minimum funding standards of the Act, the normal
cost of the plan for the plan year must be funded on a current
basis."' In the case of a plan in existence on January 1, 1974, the un-
funded past service liability must be amortized over a period of 40
years in equal annual installments. 242 In the case of a plan which
comes into existence after January I, 1974, the unfunded past service
liability must be amortized over a period of 30 years. 243 In addition,
any net experience loss must be amortized separately over a period of
15 years in equal annual installments. 244
In addition to establishing minimum funding standards, the Act
imposes a tax on the failure to meet those standards. For each taxable
year, a tax of live percent is levied on the accumulated funding defi-
ciency existing under the plan. 245 If the accumulated funding defi-
ciency is not corrected within 90 days, a tax of 100 percent is imposed
upon the uncorrected deficiency. 24 "
Nevertheless, the minimum funding requirements appear to be
inadequate. Many pension plans terminate long before the expiration
of 15 years."' It is therefore doubtful that the amortization of net
experience losses over a period of 15 years will contribute in any sig-
nificant way towards creating an adequacy of funding. The problem
becomes more critical in the case of unfunded past service costs which
2" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (1975).
141 Id. § 1082(6)(2)(A).
"2 Id. § 108204(2)(3)0).
243 Id. § I082(6)(2)( 8)(ii).
244
	 § 1082(6)(2)(8)(iv).
145 26 U.S.C.A. § 4971(a) (1975).
240 Id. § 4971(6), (c)(3).
241 See text at notes 253 & 274 infra.
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can be amortized over a period of as long as 40 years. Here the likeli-
hood of plan termination' prior to full amortization is even greater.
ERISA also establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion to insure that participants in private plans are protected against
termination of the plan under which they are covered."" In the event
that a defined benefit plan terminates, the insurance, which is fi-
nanced through employer premiums, covers vested pension benefits
up to $750 monthly."" However, if the plan terminates within five
years after its creation, vested benefits are only partially insured. 25 "
The employer may be held liable for up to thirty percent of his net
worth for these insurance payments, which must be made upon the
termination of a plan. 2"
The termination insurance provided for in ERISA is inadequate
in two respects. First, it does not provide insurance for defined con-
tribution pension plans, leaving this class of plans with no coverage at
all. Second, it provides only partial coverage for participants in de-
fined benefit plans which came into existence less than five years
prior to termination. 252 In view of the fact that more than half of the
pension plans which were terminated between 1955 and 1965 had
been in existence for less than six years,'" this limitation significantly
circumscribes the Act's potential for guaranteeing benefits.
The minimum funding standard and the reinsurance program
also fail on a more elementary level. The funding and reinsurance
provisions serve only to mitigate the consequences of pension fund fail-
ure. A basic cause of fund failurethe lack of an effective standard
For investment decision-making—is unaffected by the funding and
reinsurance provisions. Thus, they offer only symptomatic relief to
the continuing dangers of breach of trust.
V. INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS UNDER ERISA
In 1965, the President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs rejected the di-
rect regulation of investment. "In view of the wide legitimate differ-
ences regarding the most advantageous balance of retirement funds
investments," the Committee concluded that it was undesirable to "re-
quire conformity to a prescribed rule with respect to the proportion
of stocks to other investments."'" In enacting ERISA, Congress ap-
2" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a).
240 Id. § I 322(b) (3).
250 Id. § 1322(14(8).
"' Id. § 1362(6).
" 2 Id. § 1322(14(8).
25B
	 Terminations of Pension Plans: Eleven Years' Experience, 90 MONTHLY
LABOR REV. 26, 26-27 (June 1967). This data was abstracted from the termination re-
cord files of the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
254 PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE
RETIREMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS. PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS XV (1965).
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parently adopted the Committee's view, for the Act does not impose
specific investment restrictions on the investment managers of pension
plans.
The enactment of a prudent man rule on the federal level, with-
out explicit investment guidelines, makes little or no sense where
portfolio analysis and elusive measures of risk and return are the only
governing standards of prudence. Assuming that a trustee can distill
risk and return; it is nearly impossible for him to select, from an infi-
nite range of efficient' portfolios, that risk level which is "appropriate"
under the prudent man rule. The inevitable linchpin in any regula-
tory solution to the problem of risk is the determination of risk pref-
erences. Moreover, once determined, there is still the question of
whether the legal norm should be stricter where a plan is unilaterally
established and employer-managed than where it is collectively bar-
gained. •
It is at this point that financial analysis is of no assistance in the
establishment of a legal standard. Rational investors will choose
among risky alternatives by assigning to each a subjective value which
takes into account their desire for expected return as well as the risk
they expect to encounter in the investment process. 255 Using the
economist's concept of the utility curve, the investor must decide
where he wants to be on a hypothetical expected return versus risk
line. 255 Though it may be relatively easy to construct an approxima-
tion of an individual's so-called "utility function," the trustee investing
for a group of beneficiaries must impute numerous risk preferences
which he can defend on the grounds of prudence. 257 This determina-
tion itself contributes to a hopeless confusion which undermines the
ability of the legal standard to establish objective criteria. Where a
pension trustee with a definite self-interest in the performance of the
fund must choose investments only on the strength of "logic and
custom,"258 the utility of such a standard must be questioned.
Moreover, even if the standard were capable of definitive application
in the context of an individual investment, it would probably still not
be enforceable, because under modern portfolio theory risk should
only be evaluated on the basis of the portfolio as a whole.
For these reasons, the question of specific investment regulation
may now be ripe for reconsideration. Partial regulation, as in the New
York "mixed" statute 255 or as in an exclusive legal list of permissible
2 " Cf. P. Di Etz. PENSION FUNDS—MEASURING INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 33 (1966).
For a summary of the various factors and risks involved in the investment process, see
F. AMLING, INVESTMENTS—AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 3-33 (2d
ed. 1970).
ne Cf. P. DtErz,supra note 255, at 33.
2" For a more thorough discussion of utility functions with regard to pension
fund investment managers, see id. at 33-36.
250 Kassouf, Towards a Legal Framework for Efficiency and Equity in the Securities
Markets, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 428 (1974).
259 N.Y. ESTATES. POWERS & TRUST LAWS § II-2.2(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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investments, may be the only feasible mechanism for preventing
management from making speculative or otherwise unsuitable invest-
ments to the potential disadvantage of employees. In attempting to
stabilize the financial position of insurance companies and to protect
them from undue vulnerability to shifts in general economic condi-
tions, insurance laws almost universally set specific limitations on a life
insurer's investments in variable value securities, such as common
stock.'" The general regulatory pattern frequently goes so far as to
prescribe a variety of qualitative requirements for permissible
investments.'" This intervention in the management of insurance
companies is based on the justification of safeguarding against the dis-
sipation of assets. This same justification applies with equal force to
support the regulation of pension funds.
The management of pension funds, in fact, reveals a closer kin-
ship to the investment practices of insurance funds than it does to the
administration of personal trusts from whence the prudent man rule
was derived. Typically, there is a tension in the policy of insurance
companies between safe, low-return investments and high-risk, high-
yield investments."' As in the case of pension funds, safety of the
principal is of paramount public concern. Again, as in the case of
pension funds, it is only indirectly, through the reduction of the
insurer's costs, that earnings on investments in excess of expected
yield redound to the benefit of the policyholder or beneficiary. 21" In-
surance funds, like pension trusts, grow through the steady accumula-
tion of regular contributions and the reinvestment of earnings. Thus,
in both cases, the continuous inflow of cash contributions, calculated
to satisfy predicted disbursements, Frees the trustee from constant
considerations of liquidity. Furthermore, the absence of a necessary
distinction between "principal" and "income" 2" and of the opposition
between income beneficiaries and remaindermen permits the pension
trustee an alarmingly broad choice in the disposition of trust assets.
With public policy so strongly in support of protection of the prom-
ised benefits in both cases, it is strikingly anomalous that two such
similar entities are treated so differently under the law.
2611 For a concise discussion of typical policy objectives in insurance company reg-
ulations, see Kimball and Denenberg, The Regulation of Inveslotents: A Wisconsin Viewpoint,
in S. KIMBALL & H. DENENBERG (eds.), INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY:
STUDIES IN INSURANCE REGULATION (1969).
201 See, e.g., N.Y. INSURANCE LAWS § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
262 See note 58 supra.
"'Funds constituting the reserves for the insurance policy are invested so as to
earn a return on the basis of which company reserves are calculated and premiums are
fixed, Bell & FraMe, Legal Framework, Trends, and Developments in Investment Practices of
Life Insurance Companies, 17 LAW' & CoKtEmr. PROB. 45, 71 (1952). The expectation of
earnings on the invested premiums reduces the initial cost of insurance. Id. In par-
ticipating life insurance companies, higher than expected returns on fund investment
will continue to reduce the cost of payments through dividends to policy holders. Id.
2114 Note that a qualifying trust is exempt from tax on both capital gains and or-
dinary income. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 501(a).
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The question remains, however, as to whether the experience
with the regulation of insurance companies has been such as to war-
rant emulation in the area of pension funds. While the protective
concerns of state legislatures in regard to both insurance companies
and pension funds appear to be the same, the origins of insurance
company regulation illuminate an important distinction. Insurance
company regulation developed in reaction to inter-corporate abuses265
rather than to fear of unwise investment on the part of asset mana-
gers. At the turn of the century, wide latitude had been permitted to
insurance fund investments. 266 In 1905, however, the highly influen-
tial Report of the Armstrong Committee 257 concluded that common
stock was an inappropriate investment for insurance companies be-
cause of the potential for self-dealing. 268 When insurance companies
controlled corporations engaged in other businesses, the risk of loss to
policyholders was simply too great if the company was allowed to in-
vest in the controlled corporations. It has been suggested that al-
though the report categorically stated that common stock was inher-
ently unsuitable, 269 there was no evidence to support its conclusion. 270
Nevertheless, its recommendation prohibiting investment in common
equities has "cast a long shadow" over state legislative policies ever
since."' Indeed, critics of insurance regulation have consistently been
in favor of undoing the influence of the Armstrong Investigation and
easing the restrictions on insurance company investments. 272
Challenges to the continuing validity of regulation in the area of
insurance, however, may not be appropriate when addressed to pen-
sion funds. Insurance companies are long-term investors. The long-
term character of the business gives it the strength to ride out depres-
sions and weather diverse fluctuations in the value of its investments
which short-term businesses do not have. This strength permits risky
investments and militates against restrictive state regulation. Indeed,
critics of insurance regulation often rely on this feature and on the
fairly convincing evidence of insurer stability to conclude that "the
capacity of life [insurance] companies for risk taking is appreciably
greater than the degree of risk taking reflected in their investment
portfolios."'"
Pension funds, on the other hand, cannot offer the same
265
	 Bell & Fraine, supra note 263, at 46-47.
266 Id. at 46.
26r
	 inquiry is also commonly referred to as the Hughes Investigation. See id.
268 Bell & Frahm, supra note 263, at 75-76, citing 10 REPORT OF THE LEGISIATIVE
INSURANCE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE 389 (1905).
269 Id.
mkt at 75. The author asserts that the only support for the Committee's con-
clusion lay in the undocumented opinions of two witnesses. Id., citing 2 TESTIMONY
TAKEN BY THE LEGISLATIVE INSURANCE IVESTICATING COMMITTEE 1361 (1905); 5 id. at
3889.
228 Bell & Fraine, supra note 263, at 74-75.
172 See, e.g., id. at 76, 78-79.
223 J. WALTER, THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 61-62 (1962).
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guarantee of endurance. In the 1972 survey of terminating plans by
the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Labor, more
than 50 percent of all claimants under terminated plans, representing
over 40 percent of all benefit losses, were participants in plans less
than ten years old. 274 Therefore, the argument in favor of elimination
of investment restrictions on insurance companies has only remote
bearing on the utility of such restrictions in the pension fund area.
The more important question, it would seem, concerns the form such
pension plan restraints should take if legislatively imposed.
It is submitted that a code of permissible investments is the
necessary alternative to the ineffective prudent man standard. Regard-
less of the sacrifice of investment flexibility, such specific investment
restrictions may, by fiat, eliminate the risk of loss which imprecise
portfolio management could not reduce by diversification. If such is
the case, the statutory prohibition of any particular quality of risk
should result in more than commensurate gain to the security of pen-
sion benefits.
Congressional avoidance of investment restrictions on private
pension funds in ERISA may reflect an implicit judgment that in-
vestment restrictions will increase costs of retirement plans without
providing an offsetting benefit. Much has been written on the subject
of investment regulation and its relation to efficient portfolio
management, 275 but little of this has been conclusive. What does seem
clear is that investment controls typkally have isolated only one type
of risk—funding loss—and in so doing have ignored others. 276 Al-
though the express purpose of regulation has always been to place
limits on the degree of risk to which assets will be subjected, critics
have charged that such controls are misconceived, are hampering per-
formance, and are forcing managers to take larger risks in order to
achieve a given return. 2"
That investment restrictions will increase costs is not an empiri-
cally compelled proposition. Attractive as is the logic of portfolio
analysis, it may overlook the value of limitations on the risk of loss,
even at the expense of overall portfolio efficiency. Certainly, some
securities—such as common stock in new companies or in companies
with a history of instability—can be categorically excluded from a
trustee's choices without gravely affecting the efficiency of the port-
folio.
Congress' failure to articulate a code of proper investments may
also bespeak the difficulty of the task. Indeed, regulatory patterns
have been roundly criticized for their constant emphasis on the poten•
274 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STUDY OF PENSION
PLAN TERMINATIONS, 1972: FINAL REPORT 39 (1973) (Table 4-3).
272 E.g., P. DIETZ, PENSION FUNDS—MEASURING I NVESTM ENT  PERFORMANCE (1966).
26 For a discussion of other types of risk, including liquidity and inflation risk,
see Note, 83 HARV. L. REV. 603, 621-23 (1970).
2" See Note, 82 YALE L.J. 1305 (1973). See also Note, 83 HARV. L. REV. 603
(1970).
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tial risk of loss and their equally constant disregard of considerations
of return, liquidity, and inflation. 278 The reluctance of Congress to
investigate alternative standards for pension trust investment merely
demonstrates an uncritical reliance on the prudent man rule, a stan-
dard long since proven inadequate at the state level.
CONCLUSION
The problem of benefit security in an employer-managed pen-
sion plan ultimately reduces itself to the question of irreconcilable risk
preferences. In a personal trust, tension exists between the needs of
income beneficiaries and those of remaindermen. Thus, the indepen-
dence of the trustee insures an unbiased, though possibly imprudent,
resolution of competing investment desires. Where the trustee and in-
come beneficiary are the same, however, as in the employer-managed
pension trust, the trustee's judgment must perforce reflect his own
self-interest. A legal standard which presumes the trustee's indepen-
dence therefore cannot effectively safeguard the antagonistic needs of
the employee in the pension context. In unilateral, employer-managed
pension plans this is a structural inevitability, and it would seem
reasonable to expect that any congressional effort to protect the em-
ployees' expectations upon retirement would either prohibit the po-
tential conflict of interest or tighten the legal standard applicable to
the trustee's investment discretion. ERISA, however, does not prevent
an employer from serving as trustee and investment advisor to his
own plan, nor does the Act sufficiently elaborate on the prudent man
rule to make it functional in this unique form of trust arrangement.
Instead, the Act addresses the problem symptomatically, through
expansion of the minimum funding requirements, 279 creation of an
excise tax on funding deficiencies, 280 and establishment of a fedefal
reinsurance program."' Yet, while annual contributions must accom-
modate experience gains and losses on investment of the fund, the
Act permits such adjustments to contributions to be amortized over as
many as fifteen years. Moreover, although the federal insurance cor-
poration will have rights of indemnification against an employer who
terminates an under-funded plan, these rights will extend to only
one-half of the sponsoring corporation's net worth. It is suggested
that the limitations on each of these remedies render them useless in
those situations where the need for relief is greatest. In the ordinary
case, amortization of investment losses over a period as long as fifteen
years cannot effectively preserve the adequacy of funding where so
many plans terminate long before the expiration of this period. In the
case where an employer whose business is failing takes excessive risks
"8 See, e.g., Note, 83 MARV. L. REV. 603, 616-25 (1970).
272
	 U.S.C.A. §§ 1081-85 (1975).
2" 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4971(a),(b) (1975).
"' 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-05 (1975).
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in the management of pension assets, the limitations are of no effect
at all.
The Act clearly attempts to accommodate the interests of both
labor and management. As the House Ways and Means Committee
stated:
In establishing a minimum funding standard for such ex-
perience deficiencies, the Committee sought to avoid two
problems. If it allowed the experience deficiencies to be
funded over a very long period of time, an incentive would
be provided for the use of actuarial assumptions that un-
derstate the costs since any resulting deficiencies would
then be made up over a long period of time without pen-
alty. On the other hand, if the experience deficiencies were
required to he amortized over too short a period, em-
ployers would encounter hardship in meeting the annual
payments."'
However, based on the questionable assumption that any effort to in-
crease the security of benefits will increase costs and, to some extent,
deter employers from establishing plans or increasing benefits, Con-
gress has reached a solution which probably fails where it is most
needed. If the employer is solvent, the suggested funding standard
will likely be an efficient corrective mechanism. However, if the em-
ployer is insolvent, it will he of virtually no protection to beneficiaries'
interests.
The fundamental issue under ERISA continues to be adequate
description and communication of risk levels such that a realistic plan
may be attained. The limits of present disclosure obligations prevent
the flow of information to employees which would clarify the quality
of their benefit expectations. In light of these limitations, Congress'
decision to employ a prudent man standard to govern pension in-
vestment choices appears to be a disappointing conclusion to an hon-
orable quest. Although the contribution of a funding standard and an
insurance program probably offers, a judicious and realistic response
to the need for benefit security, it leaves unanswered the more impor-
tant question of what constitutes good sense in the context of an
employer-managed trust.•
202 H.R. REAP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974).
167
